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Abstract. By carrying out measurements on entangled states, two parties can
generate a secret key which is secure not only against an eavesdropper bound by
the laws of quantum mechanics, but also against a hypothetical “post-quantum”
eavesdroppers limited by the no-signalling principle only. We introduce a family of
quantum key distribution protocols of this type, which are more efficient than previous
ones, both in terms of key rate and noise resistance. Interestingly, the best protocols
involve large number of measurements. We show that in the absence of noise, these
protocols can yield one secret bit per entanglement bit, implying that the key rates
in the no-signalling post-quantum scenario are comparable to the key rates in usual
quantum key distribution.
PACS numbers: 0.365.Ud, 0.367.Dd, 0.367-a
1. Introduction
A quantum key distribution (QKD) protocol allows two parties sharing a quantum
communication channel to exchange a secret key for later cryptographic purposes. The
hypothesis which ensures the security of QKD is that an eavesdropper trying to acquire
knowledge about the key is bound by the laws of quantum mechanics [1, 2]. Recently, it
has been realized that the non-local correlations of entangled states can be exploited to
make QKD secure against an eavesdropper that is limited by the no-signalling principle
alone. That is, the only assumption made on the eavesdropper is that it cannot prepare
two or more physical systems in a joint state such that a local measurement on one
system may transfer information to another, distinct system. Compatibility with special
relativity justifies this assumption in the case that the systems are spacelike separated.
That the principle of no-signalling alone is sufficient to guarantee the security of a QKD
scheme was demonstrated in [3]. A practical scheme, tolerating in particular a finite
amount of experimental noise and producing a non-zero key rate, was proposed in [4],
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and a similar protocol was outlined in [5] (these latter works, however, do not take into
account the most general type of attacks available to an eavesdropper).
In the protocol of [4], Alice and Bob share maximally entangled states and perform
on each pair of particles measurements maximizing the violation of the Clauser-Horne-
Shimony-Holt (CHSH) inequality [6]. The resulting measurement outcomes are used to
establish the secret key.
In this paper, we combine the ideas of [4] with those of the Ekert scheme [7] and
those of [8]. We introduce a protocol where the parties carry out the CHSH non-locality
test on a subset of their particles only, but otherwise perform their measurements in the
same basis. The purpose of the CHSH test is to guarantee that the eavesdropper Eve
has limited knowledge about Alice and Bob’s system, as follows from the monogamy
property of non-local correlations [9, 10]. The highly correlated outcomes obtained when
Alice and Bob measure in the same basis are used to establish the secret key, thereby
maximizing the key production rate. In this way, we obtain a protocol that has a key
rate higher than the one presented in [4], and which is also significantly more noise
resistant.
Further improvements are obtained by using for the security test the chained
inequalities [11, 12] for N measurement settings instead of the CHSH inequality. In
the absence of noise these protocols have increasing key rates for larger N . As N →∞
it becomes possible to extract one bit of secret key per e-bit shared by Alice and Bob.
This is a consequence of a property noted in [3, 10]: that in the limit N → ∞, the
correlations maximally violating the chained inequality are fully monogamous, in the
sense that Eve cannot get any information about the measurement outcomes of Alice
and Bob. This shows that the key rates that can be extracted against eavesdroppers
limited by quantum mechanics, or limited by no-signalling only, are similar.
In this work, as in [4], we restrict our security analysis to individual attacks, that
is, to an eavesdropper trying to acquire knowledge about Alice and Bob’s individual
systems independently and always in the same way. Further comments on the possibility
of proving security against more general attacks are given in the conclusion.
2. Protocol based on the CHSH test
We begin by presenting the protocol based on the CHSH inequality in detail, before
extending the approach to the chained inequalities. Alice and Bob share a quantum
channel consisting of a source that emits pairs of qubits in the maximally entangled
state
|φ+〉 = (|0〉A|0〉B + |1〉A|1〉B) /
√
2 . (1)
As usual in quantum key distribution, we consider that imperfections are present. For
definiteness, we will assume that the effect of the noise is to transform the state (1) in
the Werner state
ρ = p |φ+〉〈φ+|+ (1− p)I
4
, (2)
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and we will study the performance of the protocol as a function of p. But our analysis
can easily be extended to other states and other forms of noise, as it does not depend on
the specific form of the quantum state shared by Alice and Bob or of the measurements
performed, but only on the probability distribution characterizing the results of these
measurements.
On each of their qubits, Alice and Bob perform measurements chosen randomly
and independently. We denote Alice’s measurements by x, and those of Bob by y, and
the corresponding outcomes a and b. The joint probability to obtain outcomes a and b
given measurement x and y will be denoted P (ab|xy).
Alice has a choice between three measurements x = 0, 1, or 2, corresponding to
measuring her qubit in the bases |0〉 ± eiφ(x)|1〉, where φ(0) = pi/4, φ(1) = 0 and
φ(2) = pi/2. The probability that she chooses the measurement along pi/4 is q, and the
probabilities that she measures along 0 or pi/2 are both (1 − q)/2. Bob has a choice
between two measurements y = 0 or 1, corresponding to the bases |0〉 ± e−iφ(y)|1〉, with
φ(0) = pi/4 and φ(1) = −pi/4. The probability that he measures along pi/4 is q′ and
along −pi/4 is 1− q′.
After all the pair of particles have been measured, Alice and Bob reveal their
measurement basis. If Alice measured along 0 or pi/2, they are in the situation
maximizing the violation of the CHSH inequality. In this case, they both reveal the
result of their measurements. From these results, they compute the expectation value
of the CHSH expression. If Alice measured along pi/4 and Bob measured along −pi/4,
the measurement results are completely uncorrelated. The data corresponding to these
cases is thrown away. If they both measured along pi/4, the measurement outcomes
are strongly correlated and will serve as a raw key. In a later step, they will carry out
information reconciliation and privacy amplification to obtain a pair of identical secret
keys from this raw data.
As we show below, the security of the protocol follows from the combined facts that
Alice and Bob observe a violation of the CHSH inequality and that Eve is bound by the
no-signalling condition. We note anticipatively that the security does not depend on
the probabilities q and q′ with which they choose the measurements x = 0 and y = 0.
This is because the purpose of the other measurements is to verify that they share the
correct conditional probabilities P (ab|xy) of obtaining the outcomes a and b given the
measurements x and y. It is these conditional probabilities that are constrained by the
no-signalling conditions. The probabilities with which Alice and Bob choose x and y are
irrelevant, so long as they accumulate sufficient statistics to determine P (ab|xy) with
precision. They will therefore choose q and q′ as close as possible to 1 to maximize the
key generation rate, leaving only a few instances where other measurements are made.
3. Eavesdropping strategies
We assume that the source of particles is situated between Alice and Bob and is under the
control of the eavesdropper Eve. Eve has thus the ability to prepare the particles of Alice
Efficient QKD secure against no-signalling eavesdroppers 4
and Bob and any physical system in her possession in a joint, no-signalling (possibly
non-quantum) state. As mentioned earlier, we restrict our analysis to individual attacks,
i.e., to attacks where Eve acquires independent knowledge about each individual bit of
the key. This amounts to consider that for each pair, Eve prepares a state of three
particles, one for each of Alice, Bob, and herself‡. This state defines the measurement
probabilities P (abe|xyz), where z denotes a possible measurement performed by Eve
on her system, and e the resulting outcome. The only constraint imposed on this joint
distribution is that it is no-signalling, i.e., that it satisfies the conditions
∑
e
P (abe|xyz) ≡ P (ab|xy) for all z , (3)
and the analogous ones obtained by summing over Alice’s and Bob’s outputs. These
conditions imply that the marginal distributions for any subset of the parties are
independent of the choices of measurements made by the other parties.
The objective for Eve is to perform a measurement on her particle that will
give her maximal information about Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes. As usual when
considering individual attacks, we assume that Eve performs her measurement before
the information reconciliation and privacy amplification phase. Note that Eve is in fact
only interested by Alice’s and Bob’s results for the pair of observables (x = 0, y = 0),
since the outcomes for the other pairs of measurements are not part of the key, and are
announced anyway. Moreover, by no-signalling, Eve cannot influence these outcomes
by her choice of measurement. We conclude that there is no point for her to vary
her measurement depending on which observables are measured by Alice and Bob, and
we can therefore assume that she always performs the same measurement z˜, the one
that gives her optimal information for the pair (x = 0, y = 0). Since she does the
same measurement every time, she may as well do it right away after the particles have
been created. Conditioned on getting the output e, which happens with probability
pe = P (e|z˜), the net effect of Eve’s strategy is thus to prepare Alice and Bob’s particles
in a state characterized by the no-signalling probabilities Pe(ab|xy) = P (ab|xyz˜e).
We have thus reduced individual attacks by a no-signalling eavesdropper to the
preparation of a mixture
∑
e pe Pe(ab|xy) of no-signalling distributions, which should
obviously return the observed correlations between Alice and Bob: P (ab|xy) =∑
e pe Pe(ab|xy). In this decomposition, Eve’s knowledge is represented by the variable e.
Clearly, the most general strategy for Eve corresponds to a mixture where each
no-signalling term Pe(ab|xy) is extremal, i.e., cannot itself be written as a convex sum
of other no-signalling correlations. In our protocol, a and b take binary values. The
extremal points of the set of no-signalling correlations in this case have been described in
[13, 14]. For each measurement x of Alice, they are two possibilities. Either the output
a of x is predetermined, i.e., P (a|x) = 0, 1; or it is uniformly random, i.e., P (a|x) = 1/2.
In this latter case, the measurement x is part of a set of two measurements for Alice and
‡ While in the most general type of attacks, Eve could prepare a single, collective state describing her
system and the 2n particles sent to Alice and Bob.
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a set of two measurements for Bob such that restricted to this set, the CHSH inequality
is violated up to its algebraic maximum. The situation is similar for Bob.
4. Security analysis
Having described the strategy of Eve, we now analyze the security of our protocol. Eve is
constrained by the measured values of the distribution P (ab|xy), which in turn determine
the degree of violation of the CHSH inequality and the amount of correlations between
Alice and Bob when they measure in the bases x = 0 and y = 0. For the Werner state
(2) and the measurements of our protocol, the average value of the CHSH expression is
〈CHSH 〉 = P (a1 6= b0) + P (a1 6= b1) + P (a2 6= b1) + P (a2 = b0)
= 2−
√
2 p .
(4)
Note that with this notation for the CHSH expression, local correlations satisfy
〈CHSH 〉 ≥ 1, and general non-local ones 〈CHSH 〉 ≥ 0. The correlations between
Alice and Bob when they measure the pair (x = 0, y = 0) can be quantified by the
quantity
〈C〉 = P (a0 = b0)− P (a0 6= b0) = p . (5)
Using the results of [13, 14] mentioned above, the extremal strategies available to
Eve can be classified in different sets, according to whether the measurements x = 0 or
y = 0 yield predetermined outcomes or yield uniformly random outcomes. Since Bob has
a choice between two measurements only, the option that y = 0 yields a deterministic
outcome implies in fact that all measurements yield deterministic outcomes. We can
thus group Eve’s strategies in three sets, corresponding to the cases where x = 0 and
y = 0 both yield deterministic outcomes, where x = 0 yields a deterministic outcome
and y = 0 yields a locally random outcome, and where x = 0 and y = 0 both yield
locally random outcomes. For each set, we can set a bound on 〈CHSH 〉 and 〈C〉, and
we can also determine the conditional entropies H(A|E) and H(B|E), representing the
ignorance of Eve on the raw key, and the conditional mutual information I(A : B|E).
These properties are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1. Extremal strategies available to Eve. The first line corresponds to strategies
where the measurements x = 0 and y = 0 used to establish the secret key both yield
deterministic outcomes (D,D), the second to the case where the measurement x = 0
yields a deterministic outcome and the measurement y = 0 yields a locally random
outcome (D,R), and the third line to the situation where both outcomes are locally
random (R,R).
Strategies 〈CHSH 〉 〈C〉 H(A|E) H(B|E) I(A : B|E)
1 (D,D) ≥ 1 ≤ 1 0 0 0
2 (D,R) ≥ 0 0 0 1 0
3 (R,R) ≥ 0 ≤ 1 1 1 1
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We can now apply the Csisza´r-Ko¨rner condition [15], which gives the secret key
rate for privacy amplification with one-way communication: K = max{I(A : B)− I(A :
E), I(A : B) − I(B : E)}. From Table 1 we note that there is an asymmetry because
Eve’s ignorance on Bob’s outcome is larger than on Alice’s outcome in case 2, implying
that the mutual information I(A : E) between Alice and Eve will be larger than the
mutual information I(B : E) between Bob and Eve. Hence to optimize the key rate the
communication during the privacy amplification protocol should go from Bob to Alice,
with the corresponding rate given by K = I(A : B)− I(B : E).
The mutual information between Alice and Bob is I(A : B) = 1 − h(1/2 + p/2),
where h is the binary entropy. To compute the mutual information between Bob and
Eve, we denote p1, p2, p3 the probability that Eve chooses strategy 1, 2, 3 above. Then,
I(B : E) = H(B)−∑i piHi(B|E). Using the values of the conditional entropies given
in Table 1 and H(B) = 1, we find I(B : E) = p1. This probability is constrained by the
fact that the pi are positive, sum to one, and yield the measured values of 〈CHSH 〉 and
〈C〉. These last two conditions take the form
p1 ≤ 〈CHSH 〉 (6)
and
p1 + p3 ≥ 〈C〉 . (7)
Using condition (6) and the value (4), we deduce that the key rate is related to the
violation of the CHSH inequality through
K ≥
√
2p− h(1 + p
2
)− 1 , (8)
with equality attained if Eve saturates the inequalities of Table 1. In the absence of noise
(p = 1), we find K ≥ √2− 1 ≃ 0.414 which is almost 4 times larger than the noise-free
rate of the protocol described in [4]. The key rate vanishes (K = 0) when p = 0.9038
whereas the key rate for the protocol described in [4] vanishes when p = 0.9319. The
present protocol is thus also more noise resistant.
It is also interesting to compute a bound on the intrinsic information I↓ =
I(A : B↓E) which is an upper bound on the key rate using two-way key
distillation protocols [16]. The intrinsic information is defined as I(A : B↓E) =
minE→E¯{I(A : B|E¯}, where the minimization is taken over all channels mapping Eve’s
random variables e onto new random variables e¯ with probabilities Pe¯|e. From this
definition, it follows that I↓ is upper bounded by the conditional mutual information,
I(A : B↓E) ≤ I(A : B|E). This allows us to write I↓ ≤
∑
i pi Ii(A : B|E) = p3. Using
first Equation (7) and then Equation (6) with inequalities replaced by equalities (thus
assuming that Eve uses the optimal strategy saturating the inequalities of Table 1), we
obtain I↓ ≤ 〈C〉−〈CHSH 〉. Inserting the values (4) and (5), we find I↓ ≤ (1+
√
2)p−2.
We deduce that the intrinsic information vanishes, and hence the protocol becomes
useless, when p = 2/(1 +
√
2) ≃ 0.8284. Note, however, that the state (2) violates the
CHSH inequality for p ≥ 0.7071, and that a set of correlations violating a Bell inequality
(before any further processing) always has a positive intrinsic information [17]. Whether
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a key can be extracted from such data, and if it can, what is the best protocol achieving
it, remains an open question.
Finally, we mention that the security of our protocol can also be analyzed against a
standard quantum eavesdropper. Under this assumption, our protocol is equivalent to
the BB84 protocol and has the same key-rate vs noise performance. The same remark
applies to the family of protocols introduced below.
5. Generalizations of the protocol
Our protocol can be generalized in a systematic way. Consider some non-locality test
and the associated Bell inequality I. On a fraction of their particles, Alice and Bob
will carry out the non-locality test and determine the amount of violation of I. This
constrains Eve to use non-local strategies, for which she has only limited information
about Alice and Bob’s outcomes. In order to generate the secret key, Alice and Bob
will perform measurements that yield strongly correlated outcomes (e.g., if they share
singlets, they perform their measurements in the same basis), such that at least one of
Alice’s or Bob’s measurements is also used in the non-locality test. The performance
of this key distribution scheme depends on the properties of the Bell inequality: what
fraction of times Eve can fix Alice’s or Bob’s outcomes, how resistant to noise is the Bell
inequality, etc. We illustrate this general approach by introducing a family of protocols
based on the chained Bell inequality for N measurements, an inequality already used in
[3]. The protocol corresponding to N = 2 coincides with the one we just presented.
This family of protocols is defined as follows. Alice carry out N + 1 measurements
x = 0, . . . , N corresponding to measurements in the bases {|0〉 ± eiφ(x)|1〉}, with
φ(0) = pi/2N and φ(x) = pix/N for x = 1, . . . , N . Bob has a choice between N
measurements y = 0, . . .N−1 corresponding to measuring in the bases {|0〉±e−iφ(y)|1〉},
where φ(y) = pi(y + 1/2)/N .
As before, most of the time Alice and Bob choose to measure x = 0 and y = 0, and
obtain highly correlated bits which serve as the raw data used to establish the secret
key. The mutual information between Alice and Bob is thus I(A : B) = 1−h(1/2+p/2).
The other measurements are used to determine P (ab|xy) and in particular to check the
violation of the chained inequality:
〈CHAIN 〉 =
N∑
i=1
[P (ai 6= bi−1) + P (ai 6= bi)] , (9)
where bN stands for b0 + 1 mod 2. With the measurements mentioned above, we find
〈CHAIN 〉 = 2N sin2(pi/4N) for the maximally entangled state (1), and
〈CHAIN 〉 = N(1− p cos(pi/2N)) (10)
if Alice and Bob share the Werner state (2).
Let us now consider the strategies available to an eavesdropper limited only by
no-signalling. As before note first that because the measurement x = 0 is not part
of the non-locality test, Eve can fix completely the corresponding output and at the
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same time produce an arbitrary violation of the chained inequality. Eve’s knowledge on
Alice’s outcome will thus generally be larger than on Bob’s outcome, and therefore the
communication in the privacy amplification phase should go from Bob to Alice. For each
no-signalling extremal distribution, there are two possibilities: either the input y = 0
has a deterministic outcome or it has a completely random outcome. It was shown in
[10], that for any measurement y used in the chained inequality, the following bound
holds: 〈CHAIN 〉 ≥ 2P (b|y)−1. When y = 0 has a deterministic outcome, we therefore
deduce that 〈CHAIN 〉 ≥ 1, and we also have H(B|E) = 0. When y = 0 has a uniformly
random outcome, 〈CHAIN 〉 ≥ 0 and H(B|E) = 1. From these properties, it follows
that
I(B : E) ≤ 〈CHAIN 〉 , (11)
and hence that the key rate using one-way privacy amplification is lower bounded by
KN ≥ 1− h(1 + p
2
)−N(1− p cos( pi
2N
))
& 1− h(1 + p
2
)− p pi
2
8N
−N(1− p) .
(12)
The protocols corresponding to N = 3, 4, 5 are more efficient than the CHSH based
protocol for all noise levels, as illustrated in Figure 1. The best overall noise resistance
is achieved for N = 3, and corresponds to p = 0.8889. As N increases the protocols
become increasingly sensitive to noise, since they require p ≥ 1 − O(1/N). But in the
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Figure 1. Key rate for different protocols versus amount of noise (represented by the
purity p of the Werner state (2)). KAGM denotes the key rate for the protocol of [4].
KN , given by (12), represents the key rate for the family of protocols studied here.
Note that K2 is uniformly better than KAGM , that K3 is uniformly better than K2,
and that for large N (illustrated by N = 10), and in the absence of noise (p = 0), the
key rate tends to 1.
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ideal case where there is no noise, the key rate tends to one, KN ≥ 1 − pi2/8N . This
follows from a property noted in [10]: that in the absence of noise, and when N = ∞,
the correlations that we introduced are maximally non-local in the sense that they do
not admit any local component. Hence Eve must always use non-local strategies, for
which she has zero knowledge about Bob’s outcome.
6. Variant of our protocol with preprocessing of the raw key
Following the ideas suggested in [18], we introduce in this section a variant of our
protocol where the parties perform a preprocessing of the raw key before carrying out the
information reconciliation and privacy amplification stage. This preprocessing consists
of Bob flipping his outcome with probability r and leaving it unchanged with probability
1− r. Although this operation disturbs the perfect correlations between Alice and Bob,
it also prevents Eve to have complete information on Bob’s outcome, even when she uses
a local deterministic strategy. The effect of this preprocessing step on the efficiency of
the protocol is illustrated in Figure 2, where for each value of p, we have numerically
determined the optimal value of r. The result of the pre-processing is to increase the
key rate, particularly for small values of p, and to improve the noise resistance.
Note that with preprocessing, the protocol of [4] and our protocol with N = 2 have
both a key rate that vanishes for p = 0.8740. The best noise resistance for all N is
obtained as before for N = 3, with a positive key rate for p ≥ 0.8660.
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Figure 2. Effect of the preprocessing discussed in Sec. 6 on the key rate. Solid and
dotted lines correspond, respectively, to protocols without and with preprocessing. K2
and KAGM vanish for p = 0.8740. The best overall noise resistance is obtained for
N = 3 and corresponds to p = 0.8660.
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7. Discussion and conclusion
We have analyzed key distribution against individual attacks by an eavesdropper limited
only by no-signalling. The detection of nonlocal correlations is a necessary condition for
security in this scenario [3, 4]. But beyond this qualitative assertion, little is known on
how to optimally exploit the nonlocal correlations of quantum mechanics to establish
a secret key. We have shown here that by adding one measurement to the CHSH test,
the key rate and the noise resistance can significantly be improved. The idea is to use
nonlocal correlations only for estimating Eve’s knowledge, but to build the key from
perfectly correlated measurements. The resulting protocol is very close in spirit to
Ekert’s protocol, but with the tools at our disposal fifteen years after Ekert’s seminal
work, we understand much better the origin of the security.
We have argued that this approach can be based on any non-locality test, and as
an illustration have studied a family of protocols based on the chained inequalities for
N measurement settings. Each inequality in the family provides a different estimation
of Eve’s knowledge. When N is large, the corresponding protocols are very sensitive to
noise. But in the absence of noise, they allow Alice and Bob to extract asymptotically
one secret bit per e-bit. If the noise is important, it becomes advantageous to use a
chained inequality with fewer measurements to put a strong bound on Eve’s knowledge.
In general, to maximize the key rate Alice and Bob should estimate the properties of
their channel and adapt the non-locality test to the measured parameters. Using the
chained inequalities as non-locality tests, the optimal key rate is then the interpolation
of all the curves given above.
The maximal value of the resistance to noise, given by p ≃ 0.86, would be reasonable
for present-day technologies were it not for the notorious detection loophole. It is
far however from the corresponding value against a standard quantum eavesdropper,
which is around p ≃ 0.75. Inside the secure region, however, allowing an eavesdropper
limited by no-signalling only does not significantly modify the efficiency of quantum key
distribution.
Acknowledgments
We acknowledge support by the European Commission under the Integrated Project
Qubit Applications (QAP) funded by the IST directorate as Contract Number 015848.
AA acknowledges financial support from the Spanish MEC, under a “Ramon y Cajal”
grant. SM acknowledges support by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles Programme -
Belgium Science Policy - under grant V-18
Note added. As mentioned earlier we restricted the security analysis of our protocols to
individual attacks, in which the eavesdropper tries to acquire information about Alice
and Bob’s individual systems independently and always in the same way. After this
work was submitted, appeared a proof that cryptographic schemes of the type analyzed
here are also secure against general attacks by a no-signalling eavesdropper for the more
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restrictive task of key expansion [19]. The security proof of [19] should also apply with
small modifications to the protocols presented here. In particular, as mentioned in [19],
the key rate of one secret bit per ebit in the absence of noise obtained in the present paper
also holds in the general framework of [19]. The security analysis of our protocols against
the most general strategies available to a no-signalling eavesdropper remains a problem
for future investigations. In general, we expect that stronger security requirements will
yield smaller key rates, but that the features of enhanced noise resistance and key rates
reported here will continue to hold.
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